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ABSTRACT 
 
 The following is a case study of the University of New Orleans Disaster Resistant 
University project. The Disaster Resistant University project involved the creation, 
adoption, and implementation of an all-hazards campus mitigation plan. On August 29, 
2005 Hurricane Katrina struck the City of New Orleans. This disaster caused the need 
for a reassessment of the original campus mitigation plan. Both the original plan, and its 
reassessment, are the subject of this case study.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Disasters increasingly affect higher education institution communities. They 
sometimes cause death or injury, but always pose monetary losses and disruption of 
the institution’s teaching, research, and public service. For example, in June 2001, 
Tropical Storm Allison overwhelmed the Houston Area universities and colleges with 10 
to 24 inches of rain. Texas at Houston Medical School Building had 22 feet of water in it, 
causing the hospital to close for the first time in its history and damages to the Medical 
School has been estimated at more than $205 million. In January 1994, the Northridge 
earthquake damaged three universities in the Los Angeles area. All of the California 
State University, Northridge buildings were damaged and the university was forced to 
close for an entire month. The university reopened with 450 temporary trailers serving 
as the only classrooms. Damages totaled over $380 million. In 1992, Hurricane Andrew 
caused $17 million in damage to the University of Miami. The campus was forced to 
close for almost one month because there was no water or electricity. The university 
even had to purchase round-trip tickets to send students home during the hiatus. 
University insurance premiums went up dramatically after the storm.  Losses such as 
these could be substantially reduced or eliminated through comprehensive pre-disaster 
planning and mitigation actions (Building a Disaster-Resistant University, 2003, p.iii-3). 
To compensate for losses incurred from disasters, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) has awarded millions of dollars in disaster assistance to 
public and private universities and colleges throughout the United States over the last 
decade. FEMA subsequently developed an initiative to help universities and colleges 
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avoid future property and economic damage from disasters known as the Disaster 
Resistant University project (DRU). The goal of a disaster-resistant university is to 
create a campus with the ability to withstand the effects of probable hazard events 
without unacceptable losses or interruptions, by mitigating against future disasters.  
 The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 caused many communities to review 
their disaster plans and begin to reconsider issues such as safety and security. Since 
higher education institutions are themselves communities, the creation, adoption, and 
implementation of an all-hazard campus-based mitigation plan will yield substantial 
benefits. 
In October 2004, UNO was granted the funds to participate in FEMA’s Disaster 
Resistant University project. The ultimate goal of the plan is to identify and reduce risks 
throughout UNO’s campus (UNO DRU Grant Proposal, 2004, pp.1-6). Before the plan 
was officially adopted, the City of New Orleans was struck by Hurricane Katrina. The 
impact of Hurricane Katrina on the City of New Orleans and UNO created the need for 
reassessment of the plan post-disaster. 
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CHAPTER 1 
  
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
 
Overview 
 
Natural and human-caused disasters increasingly pose monetary losses and 
disruption to university communities throughout the United States. These losses could 
be substantially reduced or eliminated through comprehensive pre-disaster planning 
and mitigation actions. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
developed an initiative to promote mitigation measures for universities throughout the 
country, known as the Disaster Resistant University program (DRU). The University of 
New Orleans applied for and received a DRU grant. Grant funds were used to develop a 
comprehensive, all-hazards campus mitigation plan. Before the final plan could be 
officially adopted and implemented, Hurricane Katrina struck the New Orleans area. 
This caused the need for a reassessment of the original plan post-disaster, which is the 
topic of this case study. Once a final, post-disaster plan is developed and implemented, 
the knowledge discovered throughout the process can be used by other universities and 
communities to assist with their own mitigation planning. Universities and communities 
can reassess their own mitigation plans in light of the events and developments that 
surround the University of New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. The purpose of this case 
study is to examine the original creation of a campus mitigation plan, and its 
reassessment post-disaster, in hopes of contributing knowledge and lessons learned for 
future research and mitigation by other universities and communities. 
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Background 
 Disasters, both natural and human-caused, have increasingly affected higher 
education institution communities over the last decade. Disasters sometimes cause 
death or injury, but always pose monetary losses and disruption of the institution’s 
teaching, research, and public service. Damage to buildings and infrastructure result in 
losses that can be measured in decreases in the number of faculty, staff, and students, 
degree programs offered, and decreases in research funding. These losses could be 
substantially reduced or eliminated through comprehensive pre-disaster planning and 
mitigation actions (Building a Disaster-Resistant University, 2003, p.iii). 
 Hazard mitigation1 planning is a systematic, four-phased process for identifying 
and implementing actions to reduce or eliminate loss of life, property, and function due 
to natural and man-made hazards, including: organizing resources, hazard identification 
and risk assessment, plan development, and mitigation plan adoption and 
implementation. Phase one includes organizing resources necessary and available for 
completing the project. Phase two involves the identification of hazards that pose a 
threat to the campus and the assets that are most vulnerable to those hazards. Phase 
three consists of the planning and development of a campus mitigation plan. Phase four 
includes official adoption and implementation of the newly developed campus mitigation 
plan. Emergency Management also consists of four phases: mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery. Phase one, mitigation, refers to activities that eliminate or 
reduce the chance of occurrence of the effects of disasters. Phase two, preparedness, 
includes the development of plans and preparations made to save lives and property 
                                                 
1 Hazard mitigation is defined as any sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to life 
and property from a hazard event (FEMA). 
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and to facilitate response operations. Response, the third phase, includes actions taken 
to provide emergency assistance and effective recovery immediately following a 
disaster. The final phase, recovery, includes actions taken to return to normal or 
improved operating conditions post-disaster (Building a Disaster-Resistant University, 
2003, p.1-3).  
 To compensate for losses incurred from disasters, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) has awarded millions of dollars in disaster assistance to 
public and private universities and colleges throughout the United States over the past 
ten years. Losses include measurable interruptions to their instruction and auxiliary 
services, including hospitals or sports arenas, and immeasurable losses to research 
and the generation of knowledge. FEMA subsequently developed an initiative to help 
universities and colleges avoid future property and economic damage from disasters 
known as the Disaster Resistant University project (DRU). The goal of a disaster-
resistant university is to create a campus with the ability to withstand the effects of 
probable hazard events without unacceptable losses or interruptions. These higher 
education institutions recognize the threats posed by natural and human-caused 
hazards to their campuses and missions and formulate policies, programs, and 
practices to assess the risk and implement these across all of its teaching, research, 
and public services activities. Therefore, the institution strives to be resilient. This does 
not mean that there will be no damage from disasters, since the amount of damage 
from natural and human-caused disasters varies by force and location of the event. 
However, a disaster-resistant university mitigates this damage (Building a Disaster-
Resistant University, 2003, p.1). 
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Statement of Purpose 
 In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, many communities 
reviewed their disaster plans and began to reconsider issues of safety and security. 
Higher education institutions are themselves communities, and can draw on important 
lessons from the efforts of federal, state, and local agencies and organizations to 
reduce disaster risks. The addition or improvement of an all-hazard campus-based 
mitigation plan will yield substantial benefits. Regardless of an institution’s mission or 
focus, hazard mitigation is an important investment (Building a Disaster-Resistant 
University, 2003, p.2). 
 On October 30, 2000, President George W. Bush signed the Disaster Mitigation 
Act of 2000. This Act requires state and local governments to create a hazard mitigation 
plan that must be approved by FEMA. The law encourages and rewards local and state 
pre-disaster planning, promotes sustainability as a strategy for disaster resistance, and 
is intended to integrate State and local planning with the aim of strengthening statewide 
mitigation planning. This collaborative approach facilitates cooperation among state and 
local authorities, prompting them to work together. Colleges and universities can plan 
for the reduction of hazard losses in conjunction with similar planning efforts within their 
host community and/or state (Building a Disaster-Resistant University, 2003, p.1). 
 In accordance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, the City of New Orleans 
developed the Orleans Parish Hazard Mitigation Plan, which was approved by FEMA in 
early 2006. Vulnerability studies conducted by the City prior to Hurricane Katrina 
illustrated that New Orleans is extremely vulnerable to a myriad of disasters, some of 
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which include flooding, hurricanes, tornadoes, strong storms, hail, subsidence, drought, 
levee failure, epidemics, acts of terrorism and nuclear accidents (Orleans Parish Hazard 
Mitigation Plan, 2006, pp.1-25). These vulnerabilities were further exemplified when 
Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans on August 29, 2005. Also subject to these disasters 
is the University of New Orleans (UNO), and nine other major universities and colleges 
located throughout the City of New Orleans. 
 Natural and human-caused disasters not only produce damaging effects to 
university and college campuses, they also cause monetary impact to the city and state 
in which the institution resides. For example, UNO has a substantial influence on the 
economy of the City of New Orleans as well as the State of Louisiana. The University 
employs 1,541 faculty and staff making it the 19th largest employer in Louisiana. The 
contribution of UNO to the community is also emphasized by the fact that the majority of 
all UNO graduates remain in the New Orleans area after graduation (University of New 
Orleans Catalog, 2004, p.7). 
 Overall, effects of a disaster extend far beyond the university community, and 
impact the City of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana. Considering the large 
academic population and the economic impact and potential hazards that face the City 
of New Orleans, UNO has successfully sought funding from FEMA to reduce and 
manage their vulnerability to these disasters. In October 2004, UNO was granted the 
funds to participate in FEMA’s Disaster Resistant University project, which involves the 
development and implementation of a comprehensive all-hazards campus mitigation 
plan. In January 2005, a mitigation plan was started. Although the plan targets natural 
hazards, it also focuses on multiple hazards, including those that are human-caused, 
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whether intentional or accidental. The ultimate goal of the plan is to identify and reduce 
risks throughout UNO’s campus (UNO DRU Grant Proposal, 2004, p.1-6). Before the 
plan was officially adopted, the City of New Orleans was struck by Hurricane Katrina. 
The impact of Hurricane Katrina on the City of New Orleans and UNO created the need 
for reassessment of the plan post-disaster, before a final plan can be officially adopted 
and implemented.  
 
Description of the Area of Study 
 The University of New Orleans was established by the Louisiana Legislature in 
1956. It was created to bring public-supported higher education to the state’s largest 
urban community. The Board of Supervisors acquired a 195-acre site in New Orleans, 
Louisiana on the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain. The property was a former United 
States Navy air station (University of New Orleans Catalog, 2004, p.7).  
A number of the buildings remaining on the property were renovated for 
academic purposes during the winter and spring of 1958. In September 1958, Louisiana 
State University in New Orleans opened. It was renamed the University of New Orleans 
in 1974. By 1962, the University was operating as a full four-year, degree-granting 
institution. Today, programs of study are offered through six academic undergraduate 
colleges, including Business Administration, Education and Human Development, 
Engineering, Liberal Arts, Sciences, and Urban & Public Affairs. There is also a 
Graduate School and a Metropolitan College. The Metropolitan College offers 
educational extension, professional development, and international education activities 
(University of New Orleans Catalog, 2004, p.7). 
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The main campus now consists of 200 acres that include an arena with the 
seating capacity for 10,000 people, sports facilities, and one administrative building. 
UNO is a public university with an approximate enrollment of 17,000 students (13,000 
undergraduates and 4,000 graduate students) resulting in its ranking as the largest 
public university in the City and the second largest in the State. The student body is 
diverse with 56% white, 22.3% black, 6% Hispanic, 5% Asian, and approximately 800 
international students (www.uno.edu, 2005). The University grants bachelor degrees in 
47 programs, Master’s Degrees in 38 areas, and Doctorates in 12 areas (University of 
New Orleans Catalog, 2004, p.7). 
The University of New Orleans is classified as a Southern Regional Education 
Board Four-Year II institution, as a Carnegie Doctoral/Research Intensive University, 
and as a Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Level VI institution. It is a 
member of the Louisiana State University System. The University of New Orleans has 
become a comprehensive urban university that provides academic support for the 
enhancement of the educational, economic, cultural, and social well-being of the New 
Orleans metropolitan area (University of New Orleans Catalog, 2004, p.7). 
 
Why UNO Applied for the Disaster-Resistant University Grant 
 The University of New Orleans has created and implemented emergency plans in 
case of a hurricane, fire, bomb threats, and other disasters that could affect the 
University. However, no comprehensive all-hazards mitigation plan existed. Lack of a 
comprehensive all-hazards mitigation plan increased the University’s vulnerability to 
hazards, put the students, faculty and staff in danger of a natural or human-caused 
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disaster, and potentially cost the University millions of dollars in lost research projects 
and damaged infrastructure. Therefore, when the Disaster-Resistant University Grant 
was first proposed to the UNO Center for Hazards Assessment, Response, and 
Technology (CHART), the University’s Chancellor agreed that it was time for a 
comprehensive campus emergency plan to be developed. Moreover, the creation of the 
plan gives the University an opportunity to improve the campus and promote 
sustainability. 
 Furthermore, UNO would have the potential to provide an opportunity to raise 
risk awareness and reduce the disaster losses through mitigation planning and 
mitigation actions. The plan would also support prior efforts made by UNO to reduce its 
vulnerability. In addition to the development of the plan, the University would have the 
potential to seek out additional funding sources to further implement identified mitigation 
activities. Even more funding is now available to the University post-Katrina through 
Public Assistance Grants (PA) as well as Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) 
funds, but UNO must have a FEMA-approved plan before these funds can be received 
(UNO DRU Grant Proposal, 2004, pp.1-17). 
 
Assessment of the Plan Post-Disaster 
 The original draft of the University of New Orleans Hazard Mitigation Plan was 
developed after a thorough Risk Assessment was conducted and a Vulnerability 
Assessment was prepared. A team of UNO experts representing various offices and 
departments including the Environmental Health and Safety Office, CHART, the College 
of Urban and Public Affairs (CUPA), the Engineering Department, University 
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Administration (e.g., Chancellor’s Office, Facilities Services, and Human Resources), 
Faculty Senate, and Student Government participated in these activities. Input from 
other members of the faculty and the staff, as well as students, was included. Also 
included in the planning efforts were the New Orleans Emergency Manager, Emergency 
Medical Services, the State Hazard Mitigation Officer, local utilities, and local 
organizations and agencies (UNO DRU Grant Proposal, 2004, pp.2-6). 
Post-disaster, this draft must be reassessed with the actual impacts of Hurricane 
Katrina in mind. Participants and key stakeholders must be re-visited. The Risk 
Assessment and Hazard Vulnerability must be re-evaluated. Following thorough data 
analysis and interpretation specifically relating to the post-disaster reassessment of the 
original comprehensive campus mitigation plan, a final plan will be proposed, adopted, 
and implemented after first-hand knowledge has been obtained and considered in wake 
of a natural disaster that has recently struck and impacted the City of New Orleans and 
UNO. The purpose of this case study is for other universities and communities to be 
able to utilize UNO’s experiences with mitigation planning pre- and post-disaster 
throughout the development of their own mitigation plans. 
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CHAPTER 2 
  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 The literature collected for purposes of this case study relates to disaster-resilient 
communities and the characteristics and qualities that these communities encompass to 
mitigate the effects of natural and human-caused disasters. Theories found throughout 
the literature can easily relate and lend themselves to the formation of a disaster-
resistant university. An overview of the history of hazard mitigation and communities is 
presented, followed by a description of the principles associated with disaster resiliency. 
Next, the concepts of capacity, collaboration, education and outreach, and an ongoing 
approach are discussed in regards to their impact on creating a long-term mitigation 
plan. Other reassessments of mitigation plans are observed, as well as reconstruction 
used as a tool for sustainable development of communities. Literature involving all of 
these topics can therefore be used to theorize that if a university has the characteristics 
of a disaster-resilient community, then it can be characterized as disaster resilient. 
 
Hazard Mitigation and Communities 
 There is a long history of hazard mitigation planning in the United States. 
Mitigation plans were first proposed by the noted geographer Gilbert White in a 1936, 
Planners Journal article. Then, the Tennessee Valley Authority began helping 
communities prepare flood prevention plans. These flood prevention plans originally 
focused on corrective measures, but in 1956, began to include preventative measures 
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such as land-use regulations. By 1960, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers started 
assisting communities across the country with the development of floodplain plans. 
Most recently, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) initiated the 
“Community Rating System” to offer community-wide reductions in flood insurance rates 
in exchange for various local government actions to reduce losses from flood. To date, 
many local governments participating in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
have prepared such plans (Burby, 1999, p.249). 
Besides flood prevention, planning has also been advocated as an approach for 
dealing with other natural and human-caused hazards. After the San Fernando 
earthquake in 1971, the State of California began requiring local governments to 
prepare a seismic safety element component as an addition to local comprehensive 
plans. Florida and North Carolina now require that hurricane hazards be identified and 
addressed in the preparation of local comprehensive plans. And in 1997, FEMA 
launched Project Impact to gain attention to natural hazards at the local level (Burby, 
1999, p.249). 
In the gulf coast region, FEMA also promotes the development of local 
comprehensive plans by distributing Public Assistance (PA) and Hazard Mitigation 
Grant Program (HMGP) funds post-disaster to communities that had begun to develop a 
mitigation plan pre-Katrina. These communities have one-year from the award date for 
completion and approval of a mitigation plan, and then they are eligible to receive 
government funding for mitigation measures identified throughout the planning process. 
Since the University of New Orleans started its mitigation plan prior to Hurricane 
Katrina, the University is eligible to apply for the additional funding as its own separate 
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community. The original Disaster Resistant University mitigation plan must be 
reassessed post-Katrina, and then approval by FEMA must be granted before funds can 
be received and identified mitigation projects can be implemented (www.fema.gov, 
2006). 
Raymond J. Burby (1999, p.248) states that “planning programs reduce losses 
by affecting both the location and design of urban development and by helping to create 
a knowledgeable constituency of citizens who support hazard mitigation programs.” In 
localities where hazardous areas have advantages for development that cannot be 
foregone, such as New Orleans since it is a major U.S. port, planning programs help to 
reduce potential losses by guiding development to the least vulnerable parts of the area 
and by modifying pre-existing structures so that risk is reduced. To further limit this risk 
after development has taken place, planning controls set standards to reduce the 
magnitude of a disaster. Furthermore, by involving citizens in all phases of the planning 
process, planning programs can help to raise citizen awareness of the risks posed by 
natural and human-caused disasters. This helps to create a base of citizen support for 
mitigation efforts and aims to combat the perceived risk complex2 (Burby, 1999, pp.247-
258).  
“Recent reviews indicate that where they have been adopted, stand-alone plans 
and the hazard mitigation elements of comprehensive plans have a positive effect in 
fostering more robust local government hazard mitigation programs and a reduction in 
property damage in natural disasters” (Burby, 1999, p.249). Despite this evidence, 
some communities still do not adopt mitigation plans. This can be attributed to several 
                                                 
2 Perceived risk complex can be defined as a person’s perception of vulnerability to a disaster that is 
much lower than is actually the case. 
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factors such as failure of federal policies to enforce land-use regulations in hazard 
zones, low perceived risk of loss from disasters, and that costs of avoiding risks by not 
building in danger zones are immediate whereas the benefits of avoiding losses are 
only realized at some future date after a disaster has taken place. As a result, hazard 
mitigation planning is not attractive to many local governments or citizens. However, 
when planning is undertaken in a community, comprehensive plans have the advantage 
of taking into account a broader array of community goals, involving a large number of 
citizens, and of discovering the potential for economic development and population 
growth in less vulnerable areas (Burby, 1999, pp.247-258). 
 
Disaster Resilience Principles 
 Communities are complex, dynamic systems in which social and technological 
components interact. Disaster resilience requires combinations of opposites including 
redundancy and efficiency, diversity and interdependence, strength and flexibility, 
autonomy and collaboration, and planning and adaptability (Godschalk, 2002, p.5). 
Harold D. Foster has identified thirty-one principles necessary for achieving resilience 
(Godschalk, 2002, p.5). He organizes these principles into categories such as the 
following: general systems, physical, operational, timing, social, economic, and 
environmental. Others including Harold Foster (1997), Louise K. Comfort (1999), 
Kathleen Tierney (2002), and Rae Zimmerman (2001) have studied the response of 
resilient systems to disasters and find that they tend to be: 
- Redundant – with a number of functionally similar components so that the 
entire system does not fail when one component fails; 
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- Diverse – with a number of functionally different components in order to 
protect the system against various threats; 
 
- Efficient – with a positive ratio of energy supplied to energy already delivered 
by a dynamic system; 
 
- Autonomous – with the capability to operate independently of outside control; 
 
- Strong – with the power to resist attack or outside force; 
 
- Interdependent – with system components connected so that they support 
each other; 
 
- Adaptable  - with the capacity to learn from experience and the flexibility to 
change; and 
 
- Collaborative – with multiple opportunities and incentives for broad 
stakeholder participation (Godschalk, 2002, pp.5-6). 
 
Capacity 
 Burby (1999, pp.247-258) argues that local governments have used two 
approaches in planning to cope with hazards. The first approach encompasses the 
undertaking of hazard mitigation through stand-alone hazard mitigation plans. The 
second approach involves hazard mitigation as one component of a broader 
comprehensive plan for an entire jurisdiction or region. Stand-alone plans usually 
involve greater technical details, but they also inadvertently promote increased 
occupancy of vulnerable areas by making them safer for development. This occurs 
since stand-alone hazard mitigation plans focus solely on the areas exposed to 
hazards. Comprehensive plans have the advantage of taking into account a broader 
array of community goals by involving a large number of stakeholders. 
 Comprehensive plans developed through a capacity building approach help a 
community build internal resources to carry on its development plans with a minimum of 
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outside assistance. A systematic view toward capacity building seeks to build capacity 
of state and local governments to determine needs, seek solutions, process information, 
change priorities, programs and procedures, provide feedback, and modify behavior on 
the basis of evaluation (Honadle, 1981, pp. 575-580). 
 Capacity can be defined by the ability to do the following:  
- anticipate change; 
- make informed decisions about policy; 
- develop programs to implement policy; 
- attract and obtain resources; 
- manage resources; and  
- use current activities to guide future actions (Henstra, et al, 2004, pp.1-10). 
 
Beth Walter Honadle (1981, pp. 575-580) argues that without the ability to 
anticipate change, an organization is incapable of influencing the future. Whether and 
how an organization responds to these signals, determines its influence on changes 
that occur over time. Thus, capable entities have the ability to make policy decisions 
based on organized, relevant information that influence their future. These entities 
develop programs to implement these goal-oriented policies. 
Honadle (1981, pp. 575-580) goes on to describe capacity in that organizations must 
be able to attract resources from the environment. Resources include community 
support and acceptance, as well as citizen participation in decision-making. The ability 
to absorb resources may be difficult for small communities since not all organizations 
have the ability to attract resources, as well as spend them. A community can obtain a 
grant to perform a planning function or build a facility, but still lack in time, staff, skills, 
and instruments need to effectively utilize available funds. Capable organizations have 
the ability to attract and manage physical, human, informational, and financial 
resources. 
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Furthermore, without a community’s use of capacity building, any mitigation effort 
will likely be a one-time event. Thus, if capacity includes the ability to anticipate and 
influence change, there must be an ongoing assessment of what the organization is 
currently doing. This assessment should include: 
- monitoring  performance; 
- evaluating how well measures are doing; and 
- assessing whether or not the current level of effort is appropriate over time 
(Honadle, 1981, pp. 575-580). 
 
Information obtained from an assessment can be used to improve future organizational 
performance and must be utilized in order to effectively build capacity. Organizational 
requirements for capacity include the following: 
- the ability to forge effective links with other organizations; 
- processes for solving problems; 
- coordination among disparate functions; and  
- mechanisms for institutional learning (Honadle, 1981, pp. 575-580). 
 
The framework presented above also advocates approaches to capacity building that 
favor the incorporation or institutionalization of capacity into the permanent structure of 
the target locale. This suggests less direct involvement of consultants, circuit riders, and 
similar external and transient actors in everyday administration, and focuses more on 
transferring their knowledge, skills, and thoughts to local managers. Honadle (1981, p. 
580) sums the capacity building approach up by stating, “if there is one thing that 
capacity building does not mean, it is creating dependency on outsiders for expertise.”  
 
Collaboration 
 The most effective way to assist a community in the creation of a successful 
project is to utilize the skill and knowledge of specialists within the community and to 
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collaborate with these diverse experts.  James E. Austin (2000, pp.16-39) identifies key 
components necessary for successful collaboration within a community, entitled the 
Seven C’s of Strategic Collaboration. His criteria should be applied to community 
mitigation planning and include: 
- Connection with purpose and people – alliances are successful when key 
individuals connect personally; 
- Clarity of purpose – vagueness and ambiguity will cloud the vision of the 
undertaking and may  breed confusion or conflict; 
- Congruency of mission, strategy, and values – the closer the alignment, the 
greater the potential gains from collaboration; 
- Creation of value – collaborations are about mobilizing and combining 
multiple resources and capabilities to generate benefits, and systematically 
focus on defining, balancing and renewing value; 
- Communication between partners – good communication is essential in 
building trust, and trust is the intangible that makes collaboration cohesive; 
- Continual learning – partners should view alliances as learning laboratories 
and cultivate a discovery ethic that supports continual learning, enabling 
continual improvement; and 
- Commitment to the partnership – a strategic and sustainable alliance 
institutionalizes the collaboration process while building a deep relationship 
and long-term perspective (Austin, 2000, pp.16-39). 
 
Education and Outreach 
 One of the greatest long-term challenges to disaster resistance is diminishing 
interest in hazard mitigation. One of the most effective ways to maintain momentum on 
mitigation planning and projects is to publicize progress and successes. By publicizing 
the community’s plan and efforts at disaster resistance, implementation of goals and 
priorities is more easily achievable. One of the FEMA DRU guidelines involves 
initiatives aimed at public education and awareness. These initiatives may include 
actions such as outreach projects, hazard information centers, and technical assistance 
(Building a Disaster Resistant University, 2003, p.41). 
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 According to Tina-Marie Christian (2003, p.12), “the ultimate goal of participative 
education is to create a critically shared consciousness of analysis and strategies, and 
the recognition that each action is linked.” Through conscious critical analysis, 
community members can determine that the process used to develop policy and 
programs is linked to strategic planning that is influenced by the external and internal 
environments. By involving as many stakeholders as possible, diverse threads of 
knowledge and experiences become evident and contribute to the policy and planning 
processes. 
 A major element of the effectiveness of emergency management is the degree of 
ownership by the community. According to John Lunn (2003, p.44), “if something is 
done ‘to’ the community, it will be less effective than something that is done ‘with’ or ‘by’ 
the community.” This principle remains true for all aspects of hazards policy.  
 Lunn (2003, pp.44-45) addresses two types of listening and community 
consultation within risk management. One type is known as “covert listening” and is 
currently used by many organizations within communities. Surveys, questionnaires, and 
polls are examples of this approach. This is a typical example of organizations hearing 
what they want to hear, but it does not necessarily represent the overall situation. Often, 
pollsters or surveys simply tell the client what they want to hear and do not provide a 
result that may hinder the organization’s reputation.  
The second type of listening is known as “overt.” It is open and public listening 
which provides a forum for people who want a voice. The fact that stakeholders want to 
have a voice often means that they are passionate about the issues at hand. The basis 
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of stakeholders views should not impair his or her chances of being heard (Lunn, 2003, 
pp.44-45). 
Covert and overt listening both have their place, benefits, and limitations within 
hazard mitigation planning. Each form of listening forms part of an overall holistic 
approach. Lunn (2003, p.44) states, “consideration of each needs to impact the other for 
ultimate survival, growth, and prosperity.” Engaging campus stakeholders throughout 
the mitigation planning process, provides for added opportunities of utilizing resources 
and networks. This includes obtaining support from campus administrators, faculty, 
staff, and students. Education and outreach should also extend to the surrounding 
communities, municipality, and parish (Charvat, 2005, p.4). By informing and involving 
stakeholders, support for mitigation planning and projects is increased and the 
perceived risk complex is combated.  
 
An Ongoing Approach 
Dan Henstra (2004, pp.9-11) prescribes core elements that must be ongoing to 
effectively design and develop a disaster resilient community. His model incorporates 
the following concepts: 
• Cultural attitudes must accommodate resilience – Communities must realize and 
accept that we cannot control many aspects of the hazard variable such as 
timing, duration, and magnitude. Instead, community efforts should focus on 
elements that are controllable, such as mitigating vulnerability to hazards, 
reducing potential losses, and planning for speedy recovering in the aftermath of 
a disaster. This concept allows communities to become more sustainable without 
having to know what cannot be predicted. 
 
• Disaster resilience is a philosophy, a process and a condition – Disaster 
resilience must be seen as an ongoing process and not just an ideal condition 
that can be achieved and then forgotten. A holistic approach is required to 
incorporate input from a broad range of stakeholders in order to develop a 
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workable and lasting strategy that can be integrated into community long-term 
plans and implemented with minimal resistance.  
 
• Resilience requires an all-hazards approach – An approach that includes natural 
and human-caused hazards must be incorporated in order for a community to 
become disaster resilient. A community should first identify potential hazards and 
assess the level of risk for each. 
 
• Resilience requires an all-vulnerabilities approach – After hazards are identified, 
community vulnerability must be identified and addressed. According to Henstra, 
“vulnerability takes many forms, including physical vulnerability, social 
vulnerability, economic vulnerability, and cultural vulnerability. Steps must be 
take to reduce existing vulnerability, but current decisions and policies should not 
augment or hinder future vulnerability (Henstra, p.10, 2004). Reduction of these 
vulnerabilities is a consistent theme across various models. It must be reduced in 
order to facilitate disaster resistance at the community level. 
 
• Communities require greater resistance to hazard stresses – A disaster resilient 
community must incorporate a greater ability to resist or withstand stress 
resulting from hazards. Existing buildings must be hardened to withstand disaster 
damage, and regulations may need to be imposed on new construction. 
 
• Community systems must be flexible – Disaster resilient communities require 
flexibility to absorb hazard stress without failure. Flexibility of systems can be 
enhanced by building capacity through designing for uncertainty and by 
incorporating diversity to reduce susceptibility to site-specific threats. Likewise, 
policies such as land-use regulations and building codes should be flexible 
enough to allow for adjustment and adaptation based on disaster experiences. 
 
• Recovery capacity must be enhanced – An essential component of a disaster 
resilient community is the ability to recover quickly following a disaster. Recovery 
is a complex process which occurs at many different levels. The ability to recover 
quickly after a disaster relies on many variables such as individual recovery 
capacity of households and businesses, financial resources, community 
participation, and intergovernmental relations. To promote community 
sustainability, disaster recovery should include rebuilding to reduce future losses 
instead of simply fixing what was damaged. Planning for recovery can strengthen 
flexibility in post-disaster decision-making and minimize discontinuity between 
policy objectives. 
 
• Communities must develop an adaptive capacity – There will always be 
uncertainty regarding hazards in our environment. This uncertainty can be 
counteracted by developing an adaptive capacity and the flexibility to cope with 
unanticipated events. The disaster resilient community concept incorporates an 
adaptation element, which requires the adaptation of new polices and practices 
based on lessons learned during the event (Henstra, pp. 9-11, 2004).  
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The post-disaster period provides a window of opportunity for support for 
mitigation policies as well as stronger disaster management policies. Since disasters 
expose community vulnerabilities which may have not been originally identified, these 
vulnerabilities can be noted and addressed in anticipation of a future hazard event 
(Henstra, 2004, p.11). 
Henstra’s (2004, pp.9-11) core concepts of ongoing disaster resilience as a 
philosophy, process, and a condition and developing an adaptive capacity are extremely 
applicable to UNO’s reassessment of its original campus mitigation plan post-Katrina. 
The University Community realized the need to address vulnerabilities which were not 
originally identified and then incorporate newly identified vulnerabilities into a final plan 
to submit for approval by FEMA. FEMA further promotes the development of community 
mitigation plans, by the eligibility of communities with plans to apply for HMGP and PA 
grants. 
 Hurricane Katrina provides the most evident and prominent example of hazard 
impacts which can be used to mitigate future damages through the reassessment of the 
campus mitigation plan. David R. Godschalk (2002, p.2) states that “designed in 
advance to anticipate weather, and recover from the impacts of natural or technological 
hazards, resilient cities are based on principles derived from past experience with 
disasters in urban areas.” He proposes a sustainable mitigation policy system where the 
overall goal is developing a resilient community, capable of managing extreme events. 
Godschalk envisions an intergovernmental system in which federal sustainable 
development policy is implemented and FEMA regions help to create state and local 
mitigation commitment and capacity. The various stakeholders, such as the University 
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of New Orleans, prepare mitigation plans and carry out mitigation projects and actions 
aimed at creating resilient communities. Henstra also advocated the drawing of lessons 
learned from past events in mitigation planning. He notes that “one particularly useful 
case study would be an analysis of how a community was impacted by and dealt with a 
disaster event” (2004, p.19). 
 
Other Reassessments 
 The reassessment of a community mitigation plan has previously been 
performed in other areas around the world. In particular, the Caribbean islands of 
Antigua, Barbuda, Dominica, St. Kitts, and Nevis have all participated in the Caribbean 
Disaster Mitigation Project (CDMP). According to the December 1999 CDMP Progress 
Bulletin (p.1), “while the preferred mode for providing technical assistance in disaster 
mitigation is to incorporate vulnerability reduction measures into all aspects of 
development projects, the reality is that often a disaster must strike before there exists 
sufficient institutional and technical interest in mitigating against future losses.” The 
CDMP was created for this purpose and provides disaster-affected members of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) access to technical specialists to assist in the 
design of mitigation activities and their incorporation into reconstruction plans and 
projects (CDMP, 1999, pp.1-2). 
 Both Hurricanes Luis and Marilyn affected the Caribbean islands in 1995. 
Following the passage of both hurricanes, the CDMP Regional Coordinator visited the 
islands to discuss possible mitigation actions post-disaster. The Regional Coordinator’s 
visit resulted in the development of a series of training workshops that would train local 
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carpenters, artisans, builders, and homeowners in hurricane resistant construction. In 
addition, three consultants were hired to share their expertise regarding structural 
problems throughout these workshops. CDMP also prepared and printed booklets with 
instructions for practical roof construction and retrofitting of existing buildings. More than 
80 artisans and homeowners attended the workshops (CDMP, 1999, pp.1-2). 
 The overall response of these CDMP workshops was enthusiastic from both 
homeowners and builders. Overall, people were willing to change their old building 
practices based on what they were taught at the workshops. The booklets and training 
materials enhanced and promoted the workshop teachings. After its initial successes, 
the CDMP planned on possible future training initiatives including: 
1) preparing training materials that address key issues and priorities;  
2) building codes should exist that can be enforced by building inspectors 
    trained in disaster resistant construction;  
3) provisions should be made to update training materials on a regular       
    basis;  
4) organization of evening training workshops; and  
5) invite local contractors by letter to participate (CDMP, 1999, p. 2).  
 
As the above third initiative points out, the CDMP realized the need for regular 
reassessments of its plans and objectives. 
 
Reconstruction as a Tool for Sustainable Development 
 Ranganath (2000, p.2) defines mitigation as “a statement of intent or plan of 
action to reduce significant hazard risks while incorporating sustainable values.” A major 
goal of mitigation measures is to make a community sustainable. In order for this to 
occur, it is necessary for land-use planning and hazard mitigation projects to promote 
the avoidance of high-risk areas. Disasters tend to motivate people, provide the chance 
 26
to alter the physical development patterns to reduce future hazard vulnerability, and 
often lead to a comprehensive survey of vulnerable areas that provides a more accurate 
understanding of hazard risks. This eases the initiation of long-term measures and new 
development plans for that area. Surveys and reassessments of communities, such as 
UNO, allow for damage assessments and pre-existing mitigation and development 
plans to be reevaluated in retrospect of a disaster and in preparation of another. 
Therefore, any assessment performed during reconstruction can be used as a tool to 
make a community more disaster-resilient. 
  
Conclusion  
 In summary, a disaster-resistant university is an ongoing process that must be 
reassessed often, especially in post-disaster times, to promote efficiency and 
effectiveness of mitigation measures. The ability to build capacity and collaboration 
within a community, such as a disaster-resistant university, can further enhance and 
promote the policies and procedures developed and implemented during the 
community’s mitigation planning process. As Burby (1999, 247-258) states, UNO’s 
undertaking of developing a comprehensive mitigation plan gives the university the 
advantage of taking into account a broader array of community goals, involving a large 
number of citizens, and of discovering the potential for economic development and 
population growth in less vulnerable areas.  
As Lunn theorizes (2003), by involving many stakeholders and listening to their 
input, both covertly and overtly, chances of community acceptability and prosperity are 
increased. Henstra’s (2004, pp.9-11) core concepts of ongoing disaster resilience as a 
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philosophy, process, and a condition and developing an adaptive capacity provide 
detailed guidelines and insight into the reassessment of UNO’s mitigation plan post-
Katrina. Tina-Marie Christian’s (2003) theory of participative education and Steven J. 
Charvat’s (2005) theory of extending public outreach initiatives to surrounding 
communities and area, both provide information to the university which can be used to 
promote substantial benefits by helping to link actions of the policy and program 
together and keeping the stakeholders and public informed. 
In addition, lessons learned and best practices found by researching other 
reassessments, such as the Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project, can also be used to 
provide information for the revision of a pre-existing mitigation plan post-disaster 
(CDMP, 1999, pp. 1-2). Periods of reconstruction, and the assessments that the period 
yields, can be used as a tool to make a community more disaster-resilient. Ranganath 
(2000, p.2) argues that a major goal of mitigation is to yield sustainable values 
throughout a community. Since a major goal of mitigation measures is to make a 
community sustainable, it is necessary for land-use planning and hazard mitigation 
projects to promote the avoidance of high-risk areas.  
UNO can utilize all of the above theories and incorporate them to promote its 
own campus sustainability.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 “Hurricane Katrina dealt a devastating blow to New Orleans and the University of 
New Orleans” (Strategic Planning Survey email, Chancellor Timothy Ryan, February 15, 
2006). The University has experienced sharp cuts in state funding and a significant 
decline in self-generated revenues. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, UNO enrolled over 
17,200 students. In Fall 2005, the University was able to enroll 6,900 students in online 
courses. Spring 2006 enrollment was over 12,000 students and most classes were held 
on the main Lakefront campus. Nevertheless, this projected loss of more than 2,000 
students continues to have damaging impacts on the functioning of the University. 
These factors, many of which could have been mitigated through the FEMA DRU 
initiative, may force UNO to restructure and realign its academic programs and services. 
The following chapter describes the methodology used to create the original campus 
mitigation plan, as well as reassess the plan post-Katrina. 
 
UNO Case Study - Methodology 
 The history of case study research is marked by periods of intense use and 
disuse (Tellis, 1997, p.2). The earliest use of this type of research can be traced back to 
Europe. The methodology in the United States was most closely associated with the 
University of Chicago Department of Sociology, where various aspects of immigration of 
different nation groups to the city were studied and reported on. A case study is done by 
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giving special attention to the completeness in observation, reconstruction, and analysis 
of cases under study. According to Winston Tellis (1997, p.3), “case study is done in a 
way that incorporates the views of the ‘actors’ in the case under study.” 
 Although case studies are used throughout many areas, the field of sociology is 
most strongly associated with this type of research. As a result of issues raised by 
researchers in other fields, there was a movement to make the case study more 
scientific. This meant providing some quantitative measurements to the research design 
and analysis. After the use of quantitative methods was advanced, the decline of the 
case study increased rapidly. In the 1960’s, there was a renewed interest in the case 
study form of research when researchers were becoming concerned with the limitations 
of quantitative methods (Tellis, 1997, p.3). 
According to Tellis (1997, p.3), Yin explains that the case study can be 
seen to satisfy the three tenets of the qualitative method: describing, understanding, 
and explaining. This particular case study takes into account the development of a 
comprehensive campus mitigation plan pre-disaster, and its reassessment post-
disaster. Potential hazards affecting the University of New Orleans were identified 
through the creation of a hazard profile which covered several aspects of campus-wide 
mitigation strategies through field observation, focus group and interview discussions 
pre-disaster. Post-Katrina, the vulnerabilities of the University were exposed, causing a 
necessary reassessment of the mitigation plan post-disaster. Vulnerabilities and 
hazards were reprioritized, new hazards were identified, and the plan was rewritten to 
comply with FEMA’s DRU grant requirements as well as those outlined in FEMA’s 
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community mitigation plan program. This allowed the University to be eligible for further 
funding as a community entity.  
The background and related history of UNO is given within the context of this 
case study in order to create a clear understanding of the importance of this project. Yin 
(2003) identifies the requirement for multiple methods of evidence; whereas through the 
analysis of secondary data, the original and post-Katrina focus group discussions, and 
key-informant interviews, this case study fulfills his concept of multiple methods. 
 
Multiple Methods 
 A prime strength of case study research is the opportunity to use many different 
sources of evidence (Yin, 2003). An increasing number of researchers are using multi-
method approaches towards case studies, which is also known as “triangulation.” 
Triangulation can be described as two or more different research methods used to 
address the same issue in an effort to confirm findings and to obtain expanded depth of 
information (Krueger, 1994). Throughout the triangulation process, a researcher may 
use several methods in various combinations (Denzin & Lincoln, 1995). In this particular 
case, the multiple methods that were used to create the original plan and reassess it 
post-disaster included field observation, analysis and review of secondary, focus groups 
discussions, advisory group meetings, and individual interviews. 
 Multiple methods used in triangulation are typically referred to as a combination 
of observation, interview, and document review. In the UNO DRU case study, validation 
was increased through direct observation of records and verification of findings during 
focus group sessions and individual interviews, as well as on-site observation of the 
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damage to the University resulting from Hurricane Katrina. Findings or conclusions 
resulting from a case study are likely to be convincing and accurate if they are based on 
several different sources of corroboratory information (Yin, 2003). Multiple approaches 
within a single case study are likely to exemplify or nullify some unrelated influences, 
and likely to confirm and reiterate the related results as seen in the affirmation of similar 
hazard concerns in the focus groups and interviews pre- and post-disaster (Stake, 
1995). 
 
Document Review 
Yin (2003) explains that for many case studies, archival records, or secondary 
data such as records, articles, and computer files, are relevant.   Analysis of secondary 
data was the initial step in the development of the University’s comprehensive campus 
mitigation plan. Review of newspaper articles, Internet searches, records available from 
the UNO Office of Risk Management and the State of Louisiana Office of Risk 
Management, and hazard profiles composed by the City of New Orleans and the State 
of Louisiana, provided ample information needed to start the DRU initiative at UNO. 
 Post-disaster, secondary data was again used to reassess the University’s 
comprehensive campus mitigation plan. Statistics and records from the damage 
resulting from Hurricane Katrina were observed and utilized to edit the mitigation plan. 
Review of these documents helped reorganize the prioritization of potential hazards and 
vulnerabilities to the University, and even brought some new threats, such as mold and 
civil unrest, to the forefront. 
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Fieldwork 
 Fieldwork and observation of the University were performed to analyze the 
campus’ weaknesses both pre- and post-disaster. Yin states that in order to increase 
the reliability of observational evidence, case study investigations should allow for the 
use of multiple observers. By incorporating several observers, the validity of what is 
observed can be strengthened and different viewpoints can be incorporated. Field visits 
to the case study sites allowed for direct observation, thereby increasing the reliability of 
observational evidence (Yin, 2003). Direct observation of damage to the campus post-
disaster illustrated the dire need for adoption and implementation of the comprehensive 
campus mitigation plan. 
 
Focus Groups 
 A focus group is a group interview utilizing carefully planned discussion to 
develop insight on a defined area of interest in an inviting environment. They usually 
consist of five to ten people led by a skilled moderator. The moderator uses open-ended 
questions that allow individuals to respond, comment, explain, and share experiences. 
Each participant is welcomed to share his or her individual ideas and perceptions 
throughout the discussion (Krueger, 1994). 
After an extensive period of research and investigation, the UNO Research Team 
held a mitigation plan focus group. The focus group consisted of four UNO Facility 
Services workers, and was essentially a qualitative data gathering technique run by a 
moderator who directed the participant interaction and inquiry in an open-ended 
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manner. This resulted in an abundance of qualitative information and suggestions for a 
comprehensive mitigation plan. 
 The same focus group was revisited post-Katrina. Again, the discussion was 
open-ended and the prior information and suggestions were re-evaluated in light of the 
recent disaster. New vulnerabilities were noted and old ones were re-prioritized. The 
information obtained in the second round of this focus group was vital for the 
reassessment of the UNO mitigation plan. 
 
Individual Interviews 
 Individual interviews can provide another level of gathering data or a different 
perspective on the research problem not available through focus groups. A principle use 
of case study interviews is to obtain the description and interpretations of others. Those 
offices interviewed during UNO’s reassessment include representatives from several 
campus offices and departments: the Student Housing, the Center for Hazards 
Assessment, Response and Technology (CHART), Environmental Health and Safety 
Office, University Administration including the Chancellor’s Office, Facility Services, 
University Computing and Communications, Lakefront Arena, Campus Police 
(University of New Orleans’ Campus Mitigation Plan, 2006).  In the reassessment of 
UNO’s mitigation plan, the interviewees had similar concerns and suggestions as the 
focus group participants. Post-Katrina, these concerns and suggestions were elevated 
due to the disaster situation in New Orleans. 
 Interviews can be one of the most essential sources of case study information 
(Yin, 2003). Interviews should be structured around a guided conversation rather than a 
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question and answer session. Like focus groups, case study interviews should be 
mostly open-ended in nature. The interviewer can ask the respondents for the facts and 
opinions about the subject at hand. The interviewer may even ask the respondent for 
his or her own insights into certain occurrences, which can lead to further inquiry and 
discussion. Throughout an individual interview, respondents provide the interviewer with 
insights into a matter and may suggest sources of evidence in favor of or in opposition 
to the research subject.  
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Original Plan Development - Methodology 
 Upon receiving a Disaster Resistant University (DRU) grant from the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the University formed a DRU Research 
Team and a DRU Advisory Committee. The Research Team consisted of five members 
of UNO faculty and staff representing CHART, CUPA, the Environmental Health and 
Safety Office, the College of Engineering, two Research Associates from CUPA, and 
one graduate student from the College of Geography, all of whom worked together to 
conduct the above-mentioned campus-wide mitigation activities. 
University of New Orleans decided to develop local, “in-house” expertise in 
disaster resiliency to ensure sustainability and build capacity at the University 
Community level. Rather than contracting an external agency to develop the mitigation 
plan, the DRU Research Team decided to utilize the disaster expertise already residing 
within the UNO Community. At the same time, the DRU Researchers viewed it as 
essential to use a methodology in developing a mitigation plan that would ensure 
representation from a broad range of stakeholders. 
 Several members of the DRU Research Team conducted a risk assessment and 
hazard analysis, which identified potential hazards that threaten UNO. Next, an 
extensive hazard profile was created. The various hazards identified through the risk 
assessment were prioritized based on the likelihood of occurrence, severity of the 
hazard, and cost of damage to the University. This data provided the basis for the 
original campus mitigation plan. 
The Advisory Committee was comprised of a team of UNO experts representing 
various campus offices and departments including the Environmental Health and Safety 
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Office, the Center for Hazards Assessment, Response and Technology (CHART), the 
College of Urban and Public Affairs (CUPA), University Administration including the 
Chancellor’s Office, Academic Affairs, Facility Services, Human Resources, University 
Computing and Communications, the Kiefer Lakefront Arena, and Campus Police. 
These individuals were selected since they were already part of an established UNO 
Emergency Preparedness Committee created by the Chancellor. They were also 
already established within the UNO community and had experience dealing with past 
campus emergency situations and operations and had a vested interest in trying to 
mitigation events like those of the past. All of these entities met at an initial Disaster-
Resistant University kick-off meeting in February 2005. 
 The Advisory Committee’s main role was to be available for continuing input and 
participation during the DRU planning process and to assist the DRU Research Team. 
The Advisory Committee provided the DRU Research team with important data during 
committee meetings and reviewed and provided comments as the mitigation plan 
chapters were developed. In addition to this, most of the Advisory Committee members 
were interviewed on an individual basis to provide detailed information regarding the 
vulnerabilities of their specific administrative departments, as well as identify any 
potential mitigation measures. 
 A full Geographic Information System (GIS) map of the UNO main campus was 
also developed. The map provided detailed information and descriptions of all buildings 
on campus. The GIS map is a working map and readily supplies information to 
emergency personnel about campus facilities and infrastructure. The map also provides 
the locations of emergency responders and emergency response equipment, in addition 
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to the location of hazardous materials present on campus. Following mitigation planning 
efforts, this map would be made available to University Administration to assist in 
maintaining the mitigation plan and to emergency responders in an effort to coordinate 
response in the event of an emergency. 
 Next, a detailed inventory of campus assets was conducted. A vulnerability 
assessment was done based on the created hazard profiles and the inventory of assets 
of the University. This was completed using information provided by the UNO 
Department of Property Control in addition to data collected on research facilities, etc. 
The vulnerability assessment was used to determine what the actual risk is from an 
identified hazard. It also allowed the DRU Research Team to estimate potential property 
damage and monetary losses while assisting in the prioritizing of mitigation plan 
components. 
 The vulnerability assessment revealed three critical structures: the Administration 
Annex, the University Communications and Computing Center (UCC), and the Central 
Utility Plant. These buildings were deemed critical by the Research Team since in the 
event of a disaster, UNO would not be able to fully serve its faculty, staff, or students if 
one of these structures was not functioning or available for use. Moreover, the 
Administration Annex acts as a potential shelter for top University administrators during 
certain disasters, the UCC houses all campus-wide communications equipment, and the 
Central Utility Plant controls all of the University’s maintenance such as electricity and 
air conditioning to all facilities on campus. An in-house University Engineer conducted 
detailed engineering surveys of these critical buildings.  
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 Focus group discussions and individual interviews were conducted after the 
hazard profiling and vulnerability assessments were completed. The focus group and 
individual interviews provided opportunities to clarify alternative mitigation measures, 
develop additional strategies, and prioritize strategies that were identified previously to 
mitigate UNO against potential natural and human-caused hazards. The group 
discussions and individual interview sessions seemed to yield similar focus and 
outcome of concern. Most importantly, all those interviewed agreed that the University 
of New Orleans has significant weaknesses to hazards that need to be addressed. 
 The DRU Research Team established and prioritized goals and objectives in 
order to develop the original comprehensive campus mitigation plan. Actions were 
identified to achieve mitigation goals and objectives. The focus was mainly on 
prevention, protection of property and infrastructure, public education and programs, 
emergency services, and identification of potential mitigation projects. A plan of action 
was developed for implementation and maintenance of mitigation projects. Once the 
plan was drafted, it was reviewed by the DRU Advisory Committee. 
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Hurricane Katrina 
 On the morning of August 29, 2005, Katrina passed over the City of New Orleans 
as a category 4 hurricane (www.noaa.org, 2006). Extreme winds and water surges 
caused catastrophic damage along the entire Gulf Coast region. However, the high 
winds and rainfall were only the beginning of ongoing problems resulting from the 
disaster in Orleans Parish.  
 Within hours after the storm passed over the area, three levees failed in Orleans 
Parish. One of the breeched levees was located along the London Avenue Canal, near 
the southwest perimeter of the UNO Lakefront main campus. Waters flooded most of 
the City, including parts of the campus. The University was surrounded by flood waters 
for several weeks. The City of New Orleans and surrounding parishes were left without 
power for over a month due to the widespread flooding and the extent of wind damage 
to the electrical supplier, Entergy. On-campus electrical power was not restored for over 
six weeks. Water entered some of the buildings on campus through roofs that had 
blown off, broken windows, leaky seals, and from flooding. In some structures, such as 
Lafitte Village and Bienville Hall (both residential facilities), water rose to over four feet. 
Most of the flooding on campus was limited to the south and southwest perimeters, 
which is approximately eight feet in elevation. There is a steep incline in elevation 
towards the north ends of campus, so these areas were generally protected from flood 
waters (Vice-Chancellor Joel Chatelain, 2006).  
 The water, high humidity, rising temperatures, combined with a lack of air 
conditioning and humidity control, caused extensive mold growth throughout the 
campus. Also, as search and rescue efforts were underway in New Orleans, people 
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who were rescued from their rooftops by helicopter were dropped off on UNO’s campus 
since it was high ground. The University suffered extensive damage due to civil unrest 
from these evacuees dropped off on campus. Animals in search of dry land also made 
their way on campus. Approximately two weeks later, Hurricane Rita passed over the 
area causing further damage while delaying recovery efforts. A bad situation was simply 
exacerbated due to these circumstances (Vice-Chancellor Joel Chatelain, 2006). 
 The experiences and lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina made it clear to the 
University Community that new and improved mitigation practices were needed to 
prevent future damage to the campus. The DRU Research Team, although working out 
of a temporary office since the CHART office on the Lakefront main campus suffered 
extensive mold damage, immediately began to work on reassessing the original 
comprehensive campus mitigation plan in light of the events surrounding Hurricane 
Katrina. 
 
The Reassessment - Methodology 
 To assist with applying for Federal Emergency Management Agency funds made 
available to the areas devastated by Hurricane Katrina, the University of New Orleans 
contracted a private consultant with expertise in flood mitigation. The consultant was 
hired to assist in identifying potential mitigation projects around campus, and to apply 
for Public Assistance (PA) and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funds on 
behalf of the University. Because of the evident overlap between the FEMA proposals 
and DRU work, the consultant also devoted time to assist with CHART’s project. In 
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addition, one of the requirements for communities receiving these funds from FEMA is 
the development of an approved all-hazard comprehensive community mitigation plan. 
 Since the University of New Orleans had already begun its own mitigation 
planning prior to Katrina, it was eligible to apply as its own community, making it 
possible to apply for PA and/or HMGP grants. Now, the Disaster Resistant University 
plan had to be formatted to fit within both the FEMA DRU and FEMA community 
mitigation plan guidelines (www.fema.gov, 2006). 
The DRU Research Team worked with the flood mitigation consultant to identify 
possible mitigation projects for the main campus. This was done through several 
comprehensive on-site visits and evaluations. Hazards in the original plan were also re-
prioritized and new ones were added. For example, the original plan had levee failure 
as one of the last priorities. Unfortunately, this vulnerability was greatly increased as 
made evident by Hurricane Katrina. Newly identified hazards, not mentioned in the 
original plan, were added, including mold and civil unrest. 
The reassessment continued with the revisiting of the original focus groups and 
individual interviewees. These sources were able to provide follow-up information 
regarding the various University departments and areas they represented. The focus 
group participants and interviewees also reported on what actually happened post-
disaster in regard to his or her original comments.  
The campus mitigation plan morphed into a ten chapter document based on pre-
existing formats for community plans. Secondary data was used such as the newly 
approved Orleans Parish Hazard Mitigation Plan (2006), the Louisiana State Hazard 
Mitigation Plan (2005), and newspaper articles and reports on hazard incidents in the 
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area. Existing University plans and programs were also reviewed during the planning 
process. Reviewed items include all university emergency and evacuation plans 
including the Bomb Threat Response Procedure, Bomb Scare Procedures, Significant 
Rain Event Response Plan, Hurricane Preparedness Guidelines and Action Plan, and 
the University FY 2006-2007 Capital Outlay Plan. 
During the planning process, contacts were made with agencies and 
organizations outside of the University Community (i.e. Red Cross, FEMA Region VI, 
Salvation Army, Lakeview Civic Improvement Association, etc). A notice was sent to 
each entity requesting their review of the reassessed draft plan. They were asked to 
review the draft on the CHART website and were asked to provide insight and 
comments, as well as any information regarding their own mitigation initiatives. 
The DRU Research Team, in collaboration with the DRU Advisory Committee 
and the flood mitigation consultant, considered a wide range of strategies that could 
positively mitigate the impacts of the identified hazards, and developed alternatives. 
Five general strategies were identified to reach the goals including property protection, 
preventative, emergency services, structural projects, and public information. A chapter 
of the new mitigation plan was devoted to each of these strategies. This was achieved 
through several Committee meetings and correspondence. 
Upon completion of the above methodology measures, the original plan had 
been thoroughly reassessed. The final comprehensive campus mitigation plan was then 
submitted to the State Board of Regents, the State of Louisiana Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Preparedness, and FEMA for official approval and adoption. 
 43
CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
Introduction 
 Pre- and post-disaster, multiple methods were used to increase validity of this 
case study. Multiple methods utilized include fieldwork, review and analysis of 
secondary data, focus group discussions, and individual interviews. Generally, resulting 
data is likely to be more accurate since it is derived from several different sources of 
corroboratory information (Yin, 2003). Similar concerns about campus vulnerabilities 
were noted from the focus group discussions and individual interviews in the planning 
process for the original comprehensive campus mitigation plan. Following Hurricane 
Katrina, similar concerns were again identified during the reassessment of the plan. 
This helped to increase the validity of the case study results and findings.  
The ability to build capacity and collaboration within a community such as the 
University of New Orleans can further enhance and promote the policies and 
procedures developed and implemented during the campus mitigation planning 
process. Theories developed by social scientists such as Raymond J. Burby, Dan 
Henstra, John Lunn, David Godschalk, and Beth Walter Honadle are researched and 
utilized due to their relevance to the formation of a disaster-resistant university. The 
concepts of capacity, collaboration, education and outreach, and an ongoing approach 
are necessary components to develop and create a long-term campus mitigation plan. 
Reassessments of other mitigation plans and studies of reconstruction used as a tool 
for sustainable development of communities provided background information, lessons 
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learned, and best practices which aided in the University of New Orleans’ reassessment 
of its campus mitigation plan. 
Literature involving all of these topics is used to theorize that if a university has 
the characteristics of a disaster-resilient community, then it can be characterized as 
disaster resilient. Utilizing these theories and concepts within a university atmosphere 
ultimately creates disaster-resiliency. A disaster-resistant university is an ongoing 
process that must be reassessed often, especially in post-disaster times. By doing this, 
efficiency and effectiveness of mitigation measures is promoted campus-wide. 
 The following data analysis and interpretation relates specifically to the post-
disaster reassessment of the original comprehensive campus mitigation plan. 
 
Data Analysis:  Document Review 
 Post-Katrina statistics and records from the damage resulting from the disasters 
in New Orleans were observed and utilized to reassess the original mitigation plan. 
Secondary data was used to increase validity and included the newly approved Orleans 
Parish Hazard Mitigation Plan (2006), the Louisiana State Hazard Mitigation Plan 
(2005), and newspaper articles and reports on hazard incidents in the area. In addition 
review of newspaper articles from the Times-Picayune, Lexis-Nexis database, Internet 
websites such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the UNO 
risk management claim files was included to verify campus vulnerabilities following the 
disaster.  Other reviewed secondary data included all University emergency and 
evacuation plans including the Bomb Threat Response Procedure, Bomb Scare 
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Procedures, Significant Rain Event Response Plan, Hurricane Preparedness Guidelines 
and Action Plan, and the University FY 2006-2007 Capital Outlay Plan. 
 Additional secondary data was collected from agencies and organizations 
outside of the University community. Because of their relevance to the University, both 
in terms of the services provided or their nearby location, the following agencies and 
organizations were contacted and asked to provide information regarding their own 
mitigation initiatives, as well as their comments and insights for the reassessed UNO 
mitigation plan: 
Agencies 
1. Entergy 
2. Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VI 
3. Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness 
4. National Flood Insurance Program 
5. New Orleans Department of Transportation and Development 
6. New Orleans Sewerage & Water Board 
7. Orleans Parish Emergency Management 
8. Orleans Levee Board 
9. Orleans Parish School Board 
10. Regional Transit Authority 
11. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
 
Organizations 
1. Ben Franklin High School 
2. Lakeview Civic Improvement Association 
3. Lakeview Crime Prevention District 
4. LSU Cooperative Extension Services 
5. National Weather Service 
6. New Orleans Soccer Academy 
7. Southeast Louisiana American Red Cross 
8. Salvation Army 
9. Tulane University Emergency Management 
 
 
Data obtained from secondary sources helped verify the natural and human-caused 
hazards that could potentially impact the University of New Orleans (UNO), aided in the 
reprioritization of hazards, and provided background and historical information pertinent 
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to each individual hazard. In particular, the prioritization of levee failure within the flood 
and wind hazards discussions, was very low on the list in the original campus plan. The 
effects of Katrina and the three resulting levee breaks in Orleans Parish led to this 
hazard ranking higher in the priority list. After the reassessment, termites, epidemics, 
mold, and civil unrest were all added to the original plan’s hazard list (University of New 
Orleans Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2006) 
 
Data Analysis:  Fieldwork 
 Several post-disaster, on-campus visits provided information regarding the 
vulnerabilities of the University main Lakefront campus and the East campus. Damage 
incurred from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita exemplified previously identified campus 
vulnerabilities and concerns. New vulnerabilities and hazards were also exposed. 
Information gained also made evident the need for the reprioritization of vulnerabilities 
after incorporating those that were newly developed. Data obtained from the fieldwork 
helped to identify and verify certain campus weaknesses, provide the opportunity to 
photograph and document damage to the campus following a major disaster, and 
created the foundation for the development of future mitigation projects.  
 On-site visits aided in the documentation of the effects from hazards. Several 
photographs were taken and incorporated into the revised University mitigation plan. 
These photos included pictures of flood and wind damage, mold damage, and damage 
from termites. Photographs of the campus buildings were also added. The fieldwork 
conducted by the Research Team provided for a visualization of the impacts from the 
hazards described in the new mitigation plan. 
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Data Analysis:  Focus Groups 
 The original focus group session was held in June 2005, two months prior to 
Hurricane Katrina. Participants included UNO Facility Services experts who had been 
employed by the University for several years. Questions were asked that focused on 
past disasters around campus, identification of possible mitigation strategies, and any 
additional input from the participants.  
In February 2006, the post-disaster focus group session was held. A majority of 
the same Facility Services experts participated. Questions asked during this session 
focused on Hurricane Katrina impacts on the campus, the identification of new 
vulnerabilities and hazards, and the identification of additional mitigation strategies. At 
this time, information obtained from the pre-disaster session was also re-evaluated. This 
allowed for clarification of any previous comments or suggestions in light of Hurricane 
Katrina. 
Information gained from the revisiting of the focus groups provided references 
used in the reassessed plan regarding the hazard descriptions, property damage, and 
threat to people sections. Focus group participants provided their insights and past 
experiences with the listed hazards. This data provided the majority of the content used 
throughout the hazard descriptions in Chapter 2 of the revised plan. 
 
Data Analysis:  Individual Interviews 
 Original interviewees were revisited to provide follow-up information regarding 
the various University departments and areas that they represented. Each individual 
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was provided with a transcript of his or her first interview, and was asked to report on 
what actually happened post-disaster in regard to the original responses and 
comments. 
 Additional interviews were conducted involving particular University 
Administrators who played a vital role in the response and recovery efforts following 
Katrina. Information obtained from these interviews was extremely vital during the 
reassessment of the original campus mitigation plan, since these individuals witnessed 
first-hand the damage and campus situation resulting from the storm.  
Post-Katrina information gathered during the continuation of the original 
individual interviews included the identification of civil unrest and mold as additional 
hazards to the University. These interviews also raised several questions regarding 
what the actual role of the University should be to the community during a disaster. In 
addition, several storm stories aided in the formation of future mitigation projects for the 
University. Of particular importance is the newly identified “North Campus Plant” 
mitigation project, which involves either the construction of a new building or the 
retrofitting of a pre-existing structure to contain a University co-generation plant and 
“safe house” for University first-responders and other emergency responders (Vice-
Chancellor Joel Chatelain, 2006). UNO planned to apply for HMGP grant funds to cover 
a portion of the cost of this project. 
The North Campus Plant mitigation project is of extreme importance because of 
its ability to help reduce the ongoing effects resulting from disasters. The co-generation 
plant within the structure would essentially provide back-up power for the entire main 
campus. Therefore, if the University lost its power, the generator would start providing 
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emergency back-up power. Buildings on campus would always have air conditioning, 
which would prevent or limit the spread of mold in the event of flooding, ensure the 
continuation of University operations due to functioning computer systems, and prevent 
additional losses such as perishable items including foods and University biology 
projects and test samples. In addition, the North Campus Plant would be able to house 
several campus representatives and other emergency personnel. By having people on 
campus at all times during and immediately following a disaster, civil unrest would be 
less of a threat for UNO (Vice Chancellor Joel Chatelain, 2006).  
 
Interpretation of the Data 
 Data gained through the use of multiple methods, also known as the process of 
triangulation, provided the information needed to effectively reassess the original UNO 
comprehensive campus mitigation plan post-disaster. Statistics and records from 
damage incurred from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were observed and utilized to edit 
the original plan. Review of pre-existing and new documents, as well as the revisiting of 
the focus group and individual interview participants, helped the DRU Research Team 
reorganize the prioritization of hazards and vulnerabilities to the University, and even 
made evident two new threats: mold and civil unrest. 
 Hazards were identified and categorized into two types: natural and human-
caused. The list of hazards follows: 
Natural Hazards 
Floods3 
Wind4 
Hail 
                                                 
3 Hurricanes are included in the description of these hazards. 
4 (see above footnote) 
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Lightning 
Winter Storms 
Subsidence 
Drought 
Earthquakes 
Termites 
Epidemics 
Mold 
 
Human-caused Hazards5 
Hazardous materials spills 
Nuclear accidents 
Civil unrest 
Terrorism 
 
 A section of the plan was created for each individual hazard and included the 
hazard data and DRU Research Team and Advisory Committee’s findings throughout 
the reassessment of the plan. This chapter assesses each hazard – what causes it and 
the likelihood of occurrence. Another chapter was designed to review the impact of 
these hazards on UNO (University of New Orleans Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2006). 
 With this background, the Committee members participated in a goal setting 
exercise (see Appendix 1). Each member wrote down his or her five most important 
goals. Each member then posted their selections, many of which were not listed on the 
hand-out, and explained why they thought they were important. Much discussion 
followed.  One key concern that arose was that much of the damage that followed 
Hurricane Katrina was not from “natural causes.” Much of the damage was caused by 
looters and evacuees on campus and the subsequent mold that developed because 
there were no plans, staff, or electricity to prevent the mold from growing in the 
buildings. Also noted was the importance for the campus to reopen as quickly as 
possible for the following reasons: 
                                                 
5 Human-caused hazards are defined as hazards caused by humans, whether accidental or intentional. 
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─ Having staff on campus reduces the threat of damage by outsiders.  
─ Reopening classes on campus helps UNO to retain its student population and 
encourages students to continue their careers in Louisiana. 
─ Reopening dormitories provides housing for many who would have to live 
elsewhere, perhaps even in other states. 
─ Reopening revenue producing activities, such as the Arena, the gym, and the 
restaurants, brings money to campus, reducing the need for financial aid from the 
State and Federal governments. 
 
 After the Advisory Committee reviewed the hazards, it developed goals to mitigate 
their impacts. These are used to guide the planning and implementation of mitigation 
activities and projects. The Committee agreed that the many recommended goals could 
be organized under five general goal statements: 
Goal 1. Protect the lives and health of the students, faculty and staff. 
 
Goal 2. Reduce the exposure of the campus’ existing and future buildings, contents, 
utilities, and infrastructure from damage by natural and human caused hazards. Pay 
special attention to certain special resources on campus, including the Library, 
student housing, and records. 
 
Goal 3. Educate the students, faculty and staff on ways to protect themselves and 
their property from damage by natural and human caused hazards. 
 
Goal 4. Have the necessary emergency response facilities, equipment, staff, and 
procedures in place to minimize the danger and damage to people and property 
during an incident. 
 
Goal 5. Have the disaster recovery facilities, equipment, staff, and procedures in 
place to allow the campus to reopen immediately after an incident, with minimal 
reliance on outside sources of assistance (University of New Orleans Hazard 
Mitigation Plan, 2006). 
 
Mitigation projects were identified by the Research Team, in consultation with the 
Advisory Committee, to reach the DRU goals. A wide range of strategies were 
considered that could positively affect the impact of the hazards, and developed 
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alternatives. They are the subject of the remaining chapters in the plan, and are 
organized under five general strategies for reaching the goals: 
1.) Property protection – e.g., relocation out of harm’s way, retrofitting 
buildings  
2.) Preventive – e.g., restricted access to sensitive areas, securing power 
plant 
3.) Emergency services – e.g., warning, response, evacuation  
4.) Structural projects – e.g., drainage improvements 
5.) Public information – e.g., outreach projects 
 
After the alternatives were reviewed, the Research Team drafted an “action plan” 
that specifies recommended projects, who is responsible for implementing them, and 
when they are to be done. The action plan is included as the final chapter of the new 
Hazard Mitigation Plan (University of New Orleans Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2006). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 The use of multiple methods of data analysis in the case study of the 
reassessment of the original UNO comprehensive campus mitigation plan post-disaster, 
helped to increase validity of the overall plan. Upon completion of the process of 
triangulation and data analysis, a final comprehensive campus mitigation plan was 
developed that followed both the FEMA DRU guidelines and the FEMA community 
mitigation plan guidelines. This enabled the University of New Orleans to be eligible to 
receive future funding in support of post-Katrina recovery and pre-disaster mitigation 
projects. 
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CHAPTER 5 
  
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
 
 
Introduction 
This case study was primarily conducted to describe the theories and processes 
used to create an original all-hazards campus mitigation plan for the University of New 
Orleans (UNO), as well as reassess the original plan post-Katrina.  The study was 
developed to explore the issues surrounding the creation of a campus-wide plan to 
mitigate against natural and human-caused hazards, both before and after a disaster.  
Based on these evaluations, a hazard profile was created after conducting a risk 
assessment and holding individual interviews and focus group sessions. The result was 
an original campus mitigation plan. On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the 
City of New Orleans. Affects of this hazard are still ongoing. In light of the known 
impacts for the University, the Research Team reassessed the original plan post-
disaster. Based on the information formulated throughout the plan reassessment and 
previous chapters of this thesis, conclusions and recommendations are presented in 
this chapter. 
 
In the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 
 There is no question that the University of New Orleans has been negatively 
affected by Hurricane Katrina. On August 28, 2005, approximately 17,250 students 
were attending UNO. After Katrina made landfall, the University’s main lakefront 
campus remained closed for the rest of the fall semester. Classes were offered online, 
with only about 8,000 students re-enrolling in the fall semester.  
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 The main campus re-opened in late January 2006, and a spring semester was 
offered on-campus and online. The impacts from the storm were evident, with the 
closure of several buildings, FEMA trailers covering the main and east campuses, and 
even outdoor tents in which classes were held. Normal spring enrollment is 
approximately 16,000 students. However, only about 11,600 students were attending 
the newly re-opened University. Fall 2006 enrollment is projected to be between 14,000 
and 15,000 students, which represents a decline in student tuition for the 2006-2007 
fiscal year between $8.5 million and $12.5 million. In addition to these impacts, the 
State of Louisiana cut UNO’s appropriate by nearly $6.5 million in 2005-2006 and has 
announced no plans to restore its funding to its pre-Katrina levels. Therefore, the 
University of New Orleans must plan to operate in 2006-2007 with $15-$19 million less 
in revenue (Chancellor Timothy P. Ryan, 2006). 
 To deal with the fiscal distress, several faculty and staff members have already 
been cut. The University developed a plan to restructure itself in accordance with this 
budgetary shortfall. If and when the plan is submitted to and approved by the Board of 
Supervisors, UNO plans to eliminate degrees in two undergraduate areas and graduate 
areas. Seven other degree concentrations or tracks will be eliminated as well. Thus, the 
restructuring plan will affect 5% of the degree programs and 2% of the academic 
concentrations (Chancellor Timothy P. Ryan, April 8, 2006, personal email to UNO 
faculty, staff and students). 
 Some of the staggering impacts from Hurricane Katrina could have been 
mitigated by the creation and implementation of an all-hazards campus mitigation plan. 
Instead of focusing on the negative impacts of Katrina and the lack of time required to 
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properly create and implement the original mitigation plan before the storm, the original 
plan was reassessed in light of the lessons learned post-disaster. Through proper 
adoption and implementation of the new campus mitigation plan and utilization of FEMA 
funding for mitigation projects, the University of New Orleans can better prepare itself 
for any future natural or human-caused hazards. 
 
Back-up Power 
 Many effects of Hurricane Katrina were caused and exacerbated by the inability 
to access campus for several weeks post-landfall. As a result, the University developed 
a mitigation project known as the North Campus Plant. This plant would house a back-
up generator, as well as emergency personnel and first-responders. The back-up 
electrical power would mitigate against mold growth by regulating temperature and air 
flow following the flooding of buildings, and also prevent a downed campus computing 
and communications system. In addition, by having the campus monitored at all times 
with the presence of the emergency personnel and first-responders, civil unrest could 
be mitigated against. This would also allow for the immediate start of recovery 
processes since people will be already be on campus. Therefore, the University should 
promote this project and use any available funding from FEMA to construct this 
mitigation measure. 
 
Role of a Public University to the Community During a Disaster 
 This issue of the University’s role and responsibility to the community during a 
disaster has also been questioned post-Katrina. Since the University of New Orleans is 
 56
a State-owned facility, should it be a temporary shelter for evacuees? The looting and 
intentional damage to the campus caused by evacuees and animals in search of high 
ground, as well as the drop-off of rooftop rescues, dissuaded campus administrators 
from promoting the use of UNO as a shelter. However, the University is high ground 
during a severe flood, causing it to be an island of sorts. This cannot be changed, and 
the resulting gathering of people to the University will likely happen again when another 
event such as Hurricane Katrina occurs. Therefore, the University has considered 
preparing itself for sheltering to help combat civil unrest.  
The University should consider having on-site food and water supplies, as well as 
bedding, to accommodate the flock of people that may once again seek shelter on-
campus. By having food, water, bedding, and clothing readily available, perhaps looting 
and unnecessary damage can be avoided. In addition, if and when the University 
constructs the North Campus Plant, the presence of people on campus will help to 
coordinate sheltering efforts as well as keep the population under control. 
 
Sister-City Partnerships 
 To help ensure the continuation of services, the University should develop 
“sister-city” partnerships. These partnerships should provide each University involved 
with a back-up educational system and facility at another location for use following a 
disaster. Faculty, staff, and students could be temporarily housed at the coordinating 
facility in the event of a short-term evacuation. In the event of a long-term mandatory 
evacuation and subsequent inability to return to campus, the University could operate 
and provide its regular services from the sister-site, as well as remain housed there. 
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The University of New Orleans could partner with another school within the LSU 
system. However, other potential sister-city partners should be explored since this may 
be too geographically limited in the case of a hurricane. 
 
Review of Related Literature 
As Burby (1999) argued, the ability to build capacity and collaboration within a 
community, such as a disaster-resistant university, can further enhance and promote 
the policies and procedures developed and implemented during the community’s 
mitigation planning process. UNO’s undertaking of developing a comprehensive 
mitigation plan gives the university the advantage of taking into account a broader array 
of community goals, involving a large number of citizens, and of discovering the 
potential for development and growth in less vulnerable areas. As Lunn theorizes 
(2003), by involving many stakeholders and listening to their input, both covertly and 
overtly, chances of community acceptability and prosperity are increased. The 
collaborative model used by the University of New Orleans utilized in-house capabilities 
and involved many stakeholders campus-wide. This collaborative model worked well for 
UNO since the original plan had to be reassessed post-disaster. Instead of hiring 
outside consultants to create the original plan, in-house expertise was used. Henstra’s 
(2004) core concepts of ongoing disaster resilience as a philosophy, process, and a 
condition and developing an adaptive capacity were taken into account throughout the 
University of New Orleans’ mitigation planning and utilization of the collaborative model. 
Henstra’s (2004) advice and UNO’s subsequent use of a capacity-building approach 
proved to be successful, especially post-Katrina, when the plan had to be reassessed. 
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Christian’s (2003) theory of participative education and Charvat’s (2005) theory 
of extending public outreach initiatives to surrounding communities and area, provided 
information that UNO used to promote substantial benefits by helping to link actions of 
the policy and program together and keeping the stakeholders and public informed. 
UNO’s inclusion of other community agencies and organizations helped to coordinate 
mitigation efforts kept the faculty, staff, students, and public informed about its 
mitigation measures. These entities also provided input about their own mitigation 
plans, as well as feedback on the university’s plan, both of which proved to be beneficial 
to the project.  
Lessons learned and best practices found by researching other reassessments, 
such as the Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project (CDMP, 1999), were used to provide 
information for the revision of a pre-existing mitigation plan post-disaster. The period of 
post-Katrina  reconstruction, and the assessments that the period yielded (and 
continues to do so) were used as a tool to make the university community more 
disaster-resilient. As Ranganath (2000) argues, a major goal of mitigation is to yield 
sustainable values throughout a community. Since a major goal of mitigation measures 
is to make a community sustainable, it is necessary for land-use planning and hazard 
mitigation projects to promote the avoidance of high-risk areas. Mitigation projects were 
identified and land-use planning was refocused during the UNO disaster resistant 
university initiative in order to promote campus sustainability. 
The literature reviewed throughout this case study contributes greatly to the 
University of New Orleans pre- and post-disaster mitigation planning. However, 
theorists Burby (1999) and Henstra (2004) provided the most insightful theories 
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regarding capacity-building and using a collaborative approach to the on-going process 
of mitigation planning. As future natural and human-caused disasters unfold, the 
continuous updating and revising of mitigation plans is essential, both from campus 
experience as well as from examining other disasters throughout the country. Lessons 
learned and best practices identified throughout mitigation measures can be used by 
any university community to aid in the reassessment of their plan post-disaster, despite 
whether or not that particular campus was directly impacted by the disaster. Overall, 
mitigation planning should be performed by using a collaborative model and is an 
ongoing process that must be reassessed often, especially in post-disaster times, to 
ensure the sustainability of a community. 
Implications for Future Research 
 Throughout this case study, issues have emerged in regards to ensuring disaster 
resiliency in New Orleans. The actual utility of an all-hazards approach is questionable. 
The most relevant hazards are often not given as much attention as should be the case 
when trying to encompass all hazards that could possibly affect a community. In 
addition, the most pertinent hazards are generally not developed thoroughly when trying 
to cover so many issues. Emergency planners should reconsider the use of an all-
hazards approach in order to effectively examine disasters that may impact an area. 
 Other major catastrophes have developed throughout this study. Levee failure, 
mold, termites, and civil unrest have all been introduced and added to the original 
campus mitigation plan in high priority ranking (University of New Orleans Hazard 
Mitigation Plan, 2006). These hazards were identified post-disaster. Their original 
omission may also relate to the attempt to cover an all-hazards approach. 
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Conclusion 
 The University of New Orleans has reassessed its original campus mitigation 
plan in light of the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Several theories were referred 
to while reassessing the plan, literature was reviewed, and interview and focus group 
participants were revisited. As a result, new hazards were identified, old ones were re-
prioritized, and potential mitigation projects were developed. If the new all-hazards 
campus mitigation plan is properly adopted and implemented, the University will have 
the characteristics of a disaster-resilient community, and therefore be able to be 
classified as a disaster-resistant university.  
The impacts of Hurricane Katrina are still ongoing and the full effects will not be 
known for years to come. However, as Chancellor Timothy P. Ryan (April 7, 2006, 
personal email to UNO faculty, staff and students) states, “for a time, at least, like the 
city in which it resides, UNO will be smaller. But it will be as educationally diverse as 
always, and as we go forward, students, faculty and staff together, we will not just be as 
good as we have been, but rather better than ever.” The University of New Orleans 
Hazard Mitigation Plan (2006) is a key component for the University’s future and 
triumph over disaster. 
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VITA 
 
 
 
 Ashley Garrett is a native of New Orleans, in other words, a true southern girl, 
and proud of it! She graduated cum laude in 2003 from the University of New Orleans 
with a Bachelor of Arts in Communications. Her academic track was in film, where she 
interned on the major motion picture Ray (2003). 
 One year later, Ashley decided to pursue a master’s degree in Public 
Administration. She again attended the University of New Orleans, and decided to take 
a Hazards Policy course because it seemed like an interesting elective. The course 
description stated that the class would study natural and human-caused hazards 
ranging from volcanic eruptions to bioterrorism. Ashley found this course to be 
everything she had expected, and continued to specialize in the emergency 
management field.  
In the summer of 2005, she was offered the position of Research Associate for 
the UNO – Center for Hazards Assessment, Response and Technology. It was there 
that she worked on the Disaster Resistant University grant project, which is the topic of 
this case study. Only two weeks after starting the Research Assistantship, Hurricane 
Katrina struck the City of New Orleans. This emphasized the importance of the DRU 
project and the mitigation of disasters in general. Ashley, like most people affected by 
the storm, would always have a different perspective on the City she calls “home.” 
She continued to work on the Disaster Resistant University project until being 
hired as an Emergency Management Associate by the consulting firm, Innovative 
 66
Emergency Management, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. There, she was able to utilize her 
education and personal experiences to help others plan and prepare for disasters. 
Ashley acknowledges that she would not be where she is today without the love 
and support of her family, fiancé, and friends, the knowledge gained from her professors 
at UNO (especially Dr. John Kiefer, Dr. Monica Farris, and Dr. Robert Montjoy), and the 
grace of God. A big thanks to all of you! 
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